1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/SR.3
4 May 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

MAIN COMMITTEE I

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 21 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

CONTENTS

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII, PARAGRAPH 3

(a) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

(i) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1 TO 3

This record is subject to correction.

Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, Office of Conference and Support Services, room DC2-794, 2 United Nations Plaza.

Any corrections to the records of this meeting and of other meetings of the Conference will be consolidated in a single corrigendum, to be issued shortly after the end of the Conference.

95-80766 (E)

/...

The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII, PARAGRAPH 3

(a) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

(i) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1 TO 3

1. The CHAIRMAN said that he trusted that the evaluation which the Committee was beginning of the implementation of articles I and II and of the first three preambular paragraphs of the Treaty would meet the expectations of States parties and of the entire international community.

2. Mr. AL-HAJAYA (Jordan) said that the commitments in respect of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, undertaken in accordance with the articles and paragraphs under consideration, had been fulfilled to a reasonable extent, although with a few exceptions where the responsibility was not only that of the States exporting nuclear technology and material but also those importing it. When reviewing articles I and II it should be remembered that the Treaty would not attain its objectives unless it was truly universal; it was not only certain States which violated the provisions of the Treaty that should be condemned but also those States which stubbornly refused to accede to it; steps should be taken to encourage States to accede to the Treaty, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could refuse to assist States which were not parties; in order to achieve the objective of the safeguards provided for in Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) and in the statements by the nuclear-weapon States it would be necessary to establish unconditional security assurances, both positive and negative; finally, given that the Treaty had no implementing mechanism, but depended for that on IAEA and the Security Council, those organs should be supported without using any double standard.

3. As for the commitments undertaken by States pursuant to article VI and the preambular paragraphs 8 to 12, the arms race had been brought to a halt at the level of the two super-Powers, but not at the regional level; nuclear disarmament had also progressed as far as the two super-Powers were concerned, but much still remained to be done before it was complete; although the consultations regarding a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would be an important step forward towards nuclear disarmament, it should not be considered final since he hoped it would be followed by another treaty that would prohibit the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

4. Jordan considered that the middle East was in a special position and that it should therefore be given priority during the consideration of the various issues. Only one State with nuclear capacity in the region continued to refuse to accede to the Treaty and to submit its installations to international inspection. That situation could not continue, particularly in view of the detente that had resulted from the peace process in the region.

5. Mrs. MULAMULA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that her country's decision to accede to the Treaty had been influenced by the positive developments in the field of nuclear disarmament following the end of the cold war; it had also been a gesture of goodwill following South Africa's decision to forgo its nuclear ambitions.

6. Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 were the salient features of the Treaty which had been more violated than they had been respected in the 25 years of the Treaty's existence. The international community had witnessed them being violated by those same countries which had signed the Treaty. The United Republic of Tanzania had fulfilled the obligations it had contracted under the Treaty and was participating actively in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. She hoped for an early conclusion of negotiations on a new treaty that would ban all nuclear tests and she expressed the hope that the Conference would come up with a programme of action and a definite timetable for the achievement of nuclear disarmament in the very near future.

7. The CHAIRMAN read out the text of article I of the Treaty and said that he would like to hear from the nuclear-weapon States regarding the implementation of the obligations contracted under that article.

8. Mr. SCHEINMAN (United States of America) said that the five nuclear-weapon States fully supported the principle and objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty had given all States the assurance that neighbouring States were not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. It should be pointed out that article I had been literally implemented from the time the Treaty had come into force, and that the best way of ensuring that it continued to be implemented was to support the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

9. Mr. WANG Jun (China) said that, as was clear from the statements made by his delegation, both in plenary and in the Committee, and in the national report submitted to the Conference, China's commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons dated not from 1972 when China acceded to the Treaty but from long before, from the very first day it had had such weapons. China had complied strictly with its obligations; it had not assisted, encouraged or induced other States to develop nuclear weapons and it had supported the ban on nuclear tests, the destruction of nuclear weapons and the prohibition and destruction of chemical and biological weapons. China had complied not only with its obligations under article I but also those under article VI.

10. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that, as was pointed out in the documents submitted by his country and in the statement made to the Conference, both the former Soviet Union and the current Russian Federation had complied with article I of the Treaty. The Russian Federation trusted that the Conference would concur with that conclusion and that that would be reflected in the report. It also believed that it was necessary to strengthen the Treaty, particularly the provisions of articles I and II; in order to do so it would be best if the Conference were to decide on an indefinite extension of the Treaty.

11. Mr. BESANCEMOT (France) said that France had fully complied with the commitments stemming from article I of the Treaty.

12. Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom) said that the position of the United Kingdom was clear and had been set forth in detail in the document submitted by his country. The United Kingdom took its obligations under article I of the Treaty very seriously and it endeavoured to fulfil them fully at all times.

13. The CHAIRMAN asked whether any non-nuclear-weapon State wished to confirm what the previous speakers had said.

14. Mr. MARÍN BOSCH (Mexico) said he would like to clarify some matters relating to articles I and II of the Treaty, in particular the question of the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Mexico had no privileged information on the question, but rather depended on the information provided by institutions of various kinds, for instance the report of the non-governmental organization Greenpeace entitled "A special relationship: US/UK nuclear cooperation and the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty" of April 1995, which dealt with nuclear cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom and with the continuing failure to comply with the spirit and objectives of the Treaty. According to that report, over the past 36 years the United States had transferred to the United Kingdom copious quantities of technical information, materials and basic components for the United Kingdom nuclear weapons programme, thus contributing directly to the failure of that country to comply with article VI of the Treaty. The report also cited a statement by the Director of the Aldermaston Atomic Weapons Establishment concerning the nuclear assistance provided by the United States to the United Kingdom Trident programme.

15. He also referred to a document prepared by the Centre for European Security and Disarmament and the British American Security Information Council entitled "NATO and nuclear proliferation", in which it was stated that, although the number of nuclear weapons allocated to the allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had been dramatically reduced since the end of the cold war, there were still a number of NATO countries which had nuclear units and held United States nuclear bombs for use in the event of war. The exact number of those weapons was not known, but it was probable that the weapons were a small part of the more than 300 B-61 bombs available to the United States Air Force Europe (USAFE) and that it appeared were being held at nuclear bases in Turkey, Greece, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom. The weapons were in the charge of USAFE, which maintained them in order to comply with the rule in the Treaty regarding the transfer of nuclear weapons or devices. However, when the time came to use them, United States nuclear weapons would be loaded onto NATO aircraft flown by allied pilots, so that, when the aircraft took off, the control of those weapons would be transferred to the other State. In view of all the foregoing, he would like clarification regarding the situations mentioned during the course of the debate in order to have a clearer idea of the meaning and scope of the Treaty.

16. Mr. KAREM (Egypt) said he thought that article I was clear in that it specified that nuclear weapons or devices could not be transferred to any recipient, but that it was quite vague with regard to the concepts and

principles which it embodied. Referring to the ideas expressed at previous Conferences concerning the undertakings given by the nuclear-weapon States, he said he wished to raise two questions: first, the deep concern over the nuclear-weapon programmes of some States which were not parties to the Treaty and, second, the specific case of Israel, which was a matter of concern for the whole Middle East region.

17. He pointed out that an appeal had already been made to all States to prohibit any transfer of nuclear facilities, resources or devices and to prohibit the transfer of material destined for the nuclear industry since that would only serve to strengthen the nuclear capacity of the country concerned and be detrimental to the main objective of the Treaty and to international peace and security.

18. Mr. SUKAYRI (Jordan) said that his country had complied with its obligations under article I as a non-nuclear-weapon State. For their part, the nuclear-weapon States had complied with their obligations in principle or in general. However, if those States had complied with the provisions of article I and all other States with a nuclear capability had complied with all their obligations, he wondered how those States which had contravened the provisions of the Treaty had managed to do so since two parties were involved in any transfer of nuclear material: a provider and a recipient. It was therefore not clear where the recipient countries had obtained the nuclear material, technical know-how and technology.

19. Mr. ELTINAI (Sudan) agreed with the view expressed by Jordan concerning the transfer of nuclear weapons or devices and the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States in connection with article I. The States parties to the Treaty, both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, had complied with their obligations under articles I and II. There were, however, also States which were not parties to the Treaty and had a nuclear capability. It appeared, therefore, that the States which had contravened the provisions of the Treaty were those which were not parties to it. The detention of spies in the Sudan had provided information on the way in which States non-parties to the Treaty had managed to transfer nuclear capacity to Israel. Lastly, he pointed out that China was following the same procedure as during the cold war with regard to the transfer of nuclear material; it therefore had some doubts about China's compliance with article I of the Treaty.

20. Mrs. GUELLIL (Germany), responding to the explicit allusion made by the representative of Mexico to the effect that Germany had received nuclear weapons, said that there was no foundation for such a statement. The NATO agreements complied strictly with the provisions of the Treaty. There had never been any transfer whatsoever of nuclear material or know-how for military purpose and at no Conference of the parties had there ever been any complaint that those agreements contravened articles I and II of the Treaty. With regard to the question raised by Jordan, she added that, while there might be reason to believe that nuclear material and know-how had been transferred for military purposes, such accusations must be backed by specific data.

21. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) supported the statement made by the representative of Germany and said he believed that the question raised had nothing to do with the Treaty, in particular article I, since it involved no transfer nor any contribution to the nuclear capacity of non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the Treaty. The NATO agreements were therefore compatible with the provisions of the Treaty.

22. Mr. MERNIER (Belgium) endorsed the statements made by the representatives of Germany and Greece. Belgium had never received any military nuclear technology nor had it contravened the provisions of the Treaty in that respect. With regard to article II, he dismissed the accusations made by Greenpeace, which he considered unfounded, since Belgium had never tried to acquire nuclear weapons or to transfer nuclear technology to other countries.

23. Mrs. MULAMULA (United Republic of Tanzania) supported the statements made by the representatives of Mexico, Egypt and Jordan. She also referred to the nuclear nightmare experienced by Africa for years because of the decision of the nuclear-weapon States not to comply with the Treaty. A situation had thus been created in which an African State had acquired a nuclear capability and the countries which had had the means and capacity to verify the relevant reports doubted the accusations of the African countries, which could not themselves verify the truth of the reports. Fortunately, international pressure had obliged that State to acknowledge publicly not only that it had acquired a nuclear capability but also that it had installed nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States had assisted, encouraged and induced some countries to acquire nuclear weapons for one reason or another. Therefore, whatever they might say to the contrary, they had contravened the provisions of article I; it was not, however, up to the non-nuclear-weapon States to prove it.

24. She supported the statement by the representative of Egypt concerning the vagueness of article I, since the deployment of nuclear warheads in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States would represent a violation of article I if it was interpreted as a transfer of nuclear weapons. Lastly, she proposed that a sanctions regime should be imposed on those States which contravened the aforementioned articles; to date the recipient countries had been punished, but the providers should also be penalized.

25. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) said that the Philippines had scrupulously complied with the provisions of article II. With regard to article I, the nuclear-weapon States stated that they had fully complied with its provisions; nevertheless, as the representative of Mexico had pointed out, to judge from a Greenpeace report, there had been transfers of nuclear devices from nuclear-weapon States. If that report was true, the Philippines urged the parties concerned to clarify the matter.

26. Mr. SUKAYRI (Jordan) said that a stop had recently been put to the suspected nuclear programme of a State that could not have made progress in that field without receiving transfers of nuclear technology and materials. Jordan would like those participating in such transfers to provide clarifications concerning their methods. The necessary materials or technology could only have come from some of the five nuclear-weapon States.

27. Mr. FASEHUN (Nigeria) said that the wording of article I was precise and unequivocal and not subject to flexible interpretations. The nuclear-weapon States denied that there had been any transfers. Nigeria wondered if any transfers of nuclear material or technology from those States had taken place. According to the Greenpeace report mentioned by Mexico, the transfers were an established fact. There was no denying the importance of those charges. The present Conference differed from earlier conferences because of the decisions that were to be adopted. If there had been any negligence or violations of the Treaty the States involved must admit the fact.

28. He thought that too much emphasis had been placed on horizontal proliferation, whereas vertical proliferation was an equally disturbing problem. Like other countries, Nigeria wondered how some States had acquired the technology and resources necessary to be practically in a position to develop nuclear weapons, and what effect the transfer of such resources and technology would have on the development of those States. It also wondered if it was true that a non-nuclear-weapon State allied with a nuclear-weapon State could, in case of war, have access to such weapons.

29. Lastly, he said that, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria had stated, Nigeria's policy in the matter of nuclear weapons had always been absolutely transparent. Nigeria was receiving no nuclear products or devices that were not subject to IAEA safeguards, and it did not permit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nigeria would like all States present to make a similar statement.

30. Mr. KERVERS (Netherlands) said that the Netherlands had fully observed the provisions of article II. With regard to the publication mentioned by the representative of Mexico on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and proliferation, like the representatives of Germany, Greece and Belgium, he wished to state that the Netherlands had never acquired control over nuclear weapons. NATO had always been governed by the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty.

31. On the other hand, his delegation did not agree with the view that a violation of article II necessarily implied a violation of article I; the non-nuclear weapon States had their own responsibilities under article II and there could be a violation of that article without any participation by nuclear-weapon States.

32. Mr. MAJID (Bangladesh) said that article I referred only to nuclear-weapon States and did not prevent States that have no nuclear weapons but were technologically advanced from doing precisely what the article prohibited. Those States could not transfer nuclear weapons but they could assist, encourage or induce non-nuclear weapon States to manufacture or acquire them, especially if they were not parties to the Treaty. Bangladesh would like to have clarifications on that point.

33. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that it was possible that exports of nuclear material made in good faith and for peaceful purposes were being diverted to nuclear weapons programmes. There had been at least two cases of States parties violating the provisions of the Treaty in that way.

34. Mr. EFFENDI (Indonesia) said that his country was not in a position to verify compliance with the provisions of articles I and II. Like the representative of Mexico, he recalled Greenpeace reports to the effect that the provisions of articles I and II had been violated by nuclear-weapon States. If the Treaty was to be strengthened, every effort must be made to comply with its provisions. In that connection Indonesia would like it to be established whether the accusations of violations were true or false.

35. Mr. FOUATHIA (Algeria) said that his country was also incapable of verifying compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. Shortly after the first nuclear test on the African continent, which had taken place in Algeria, the majority of African countries had become aware of the need to declare Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa had been approved by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1964. However, it had not been possible to put the Declaration into effect because of the nuclear ambitions harboured at that time by one State on the continent. The fears of the African countries had proved to be well founded when South Africa had confirmed that it had a nuclear programme. Fortunately those ambitions had been renounced and, at the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, the final text of a treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa could be submitted.

36. With regard to the Middle East, it was stated that there had been no transfers of nuclear weapons or devices. But, once again, the reverse could be deduced from the fact that one State, which was not a party to the Treaty, had not placed its installations under IAEA safeguards and had not denied that it possessed nuclear weapons. Algeria felt that in that case, too, fears were not unfounded. It would like its concern to be reflected in the report of the Conference.

37. Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom) wished to refer to the comments made by the representative of Mexico concerning nuclear cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom, and particularly to the comment that the transfer of nuclear material and other information constituted a violation of the spirit of articles I and VI of the Treaty. The United States and the United Kingdom had made no transfers prohibited by article I. He also pointed out that the United Kingdom was strictly abiding by its obligations under article VI. As had been said in the general debate, the United Kingdom had made a considerable contribution to the reduction of nuclear forces and, by the end of the 1990s, it would have reduced its nuclear warheads by 21 per cent compared to the 1970s level, which showed its commitment to promoting the objectives stated in article VI.

38. Mr. SCHEINMAN (United States of America) said that the mutual defence agreements with the United Kingdom and the relevant NATO provisions were fully in accord with article I of the Treaty. Despite statements to the contrary, the United States had not transferred any nuclear weapons, nor had it encouraged or induced any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or acquire explosive nuclear devices. United States legislation explicitly prohibited such activities, both in the public and in the private sectors. Moreover, a comprehensive system for the control of nuclear technology and dual-use exports had been set up with a view to ensuring compliance with the provisions of article I of the Treaty.

39. With regard to article II, he wished to draw attention to the various reports prepared by the IAEA and the Special United Nations Commission on inspections in Iraq under Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991). The obvious conclusion to be drawn from those documents was that Iraq had violated the provisions of article II of the Treaty. The United States felt that the same attention should be paid to article II as to article I.

40. The CHAIRMAN said that a question of sovereign political will was involved. If a State committed a deliberate violation and did not wish to explain the reasons for its action, the only possibility left was to seek information from another State. If confidence was placed in the abilities of the press or non-governmental organizations it was because, since they were not interested parties, they were assumed to provide, independently of the results of their inquiries, a reliable and unbiased view which had a certain credibility. On the other hand he expressed the hope that the recommendations resulting from the Committee's proceedings would serve to remedy the deficiencies noted in the application of the Treaty.

41. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) said that the measures taken to monitor the export of nuclear materials, in which his country was also participating, had been strengthened in recent years, and that showed the solidarity that existed between the exporting countries and contributed to the strengthening of the non-proliferation system by the nuclear-weapon States and helped to promote faith in the Treaty.

42. Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that he had the same questions as the representative of Mexico and other members of the Committee regarding violations of article I of the Treaty by nuclear-weapon States. In fact, those States had failed to provide any clear explanation of such violations, examples of which included the agreements between the United States of America and the United Kingdom on the sale of Polaris and Trident missiles for the development of nuclear weapons systems, the supply of radioactive nitric acid to the B205 facility at Sellafield, United Kingdom, and the promises made between nuclear-weapon States to transfer information and technology relating to nuclear test simulations.

43. Mr. JURSCHEWSKY (Canada), referring to article I, said that the presumed programmes for the manufacture of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had led some delegations to conclude that improper transfers of technology had taken place. His delegation did not share that view. Unfortunately, the manufacture of nuclear weapons was based on a highly developed technology the principles of which were widely known and not confined to the nuclear-weapon States. It was even possible to find information on the design of nuclear bombs through networks such as INTERNET. That depressing fact underscored the need to improve export controls on nuclear technology to ensure that it was used for peaceful purposes and the need to strengthen the implementation of the IAEA safeguards programme. With regard to article II, he noted that since the late 1940s Canada had renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons and roundly affirmed that it had received no nuclear technology whatsoever, and would not accept it under any circumstances.

44. The CHAIRMAN read out article II of the Treaty and said that, by definition, the obligation set out in that article applied to non-nuclear-weapon States parties. He therefore hoped that those States would say whether they had respected the provisions of that article.

45. Mr. MERNIER (Belgium) agreed with the representative of Canada that a violation of the Treaty did not necessarily require two guilty parties; many of the States taking part in the debate had the capacity to develop nuclear weapons without resorting to the technology of nuclear-weapon States. Article II dealt with cases in which States manufactured nuclear weapons with their own resources. Belgium provided a broad range of cooperation in the sphere of civilian nuclear power. Given that the boundary between the military and civilian nuclear energy sectors was somewhat indistinct, the possibility that civilian nuclear material delivered to one State might be diverted to other uses that violated the Treaty could not be excluded.

46. The CHAIRMAN invited the nuclear-weapon States to express their views as to whether non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had duly met their obligations under that instrument.

47. Mr. KERVERS (Netherlands) said that the responsibility for complying with article II lay with States that did not possess nuclear weapons and not on those that did. In his view, it was not up to the latter to determine whether the former had violated the provisions of the Treaty.

48. Mr. SCHEINMAN (United States of America) supported the remarks made by the representative of the Netherlands and said that, with regard to the failure to comply with the provisions of article II, statements had been issued not only by one nuclear-weapon State but by the Security Council itself, including those having to do with Iraq's failure to comply with those provisions and Security Council resolution 815 (1993), which called upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abide by the agreement concluded with IAEA under the Treaty.

49. Mr. LAPTSENAK (Belarus) said that although his country had not participated in the drafting of the non-proliferation Treaty, it had become a party to the Treaty without reservations and was fully complying with its provisions. Belarus was an example of the way in which a State party to the Treaty could fulfil its obligations, since on acceding to that instrument it had eliminated its tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, and its current Constitution expressly stated that the country was a non-nuclear-weapon State.

50. Mr. ELTINAI (Sudan) said that the violation covered in article II was not exactly the same as acquisition; the deployment of nuclear weapons was also a kind of violation. The responsibilities and obligations of recipient States included those arising from a country's acceptance of the deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory.

51. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) and Ms. GUELLIL (Germany) said that their countries, which were non-nuclear-weapon States, were complying strictly with the provisions of article II.

52. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) said he thought it was quite logical that the Chairman should invite the nuclear-weapon States to make statements on other States' compliance with the provisions of article II, and he wondered whether the representative of the Netherlands had spoken as a nuclear-weapon or a non-nuclear-weapon State. For its part, the Philippines was a non-nuclear-weapon State which complied with the provisions of article II.

53. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that while there were confirmed instances of failure to comply with the provisions of the Treaty, including the outright production of nuclear technology, in other cases, such as that of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, failure to comply had not been conclusively demonstrated. His delegation was not aware of any other violations of article II.

54. Mr. HASAN (Iraq) said that he would not go into detail regarding the false accusations that had been levelled against his country which were a cover-up for well-known political interests. He wished to stress, however, that the attitude of the Security Council vis-à-vis Iraq was discriminatory, not objective and did not serve to strengthen the Treaty. There were States other than the five nuclear Powers that had produced nuclear bombs and still others that were trying to learn more about manufacturing such weapons, producing enriched uranium and using plutonium radiation. In addition, some States that were not parties to the Treaty had transferred large amounts of uranium to other States that were also not parties. In that context, Iraq should be cleared of all such accusations, and his delegation intended to take the matter up more fully at a subsequent meeting of the Committee.

55. The CHAIRMAN said it seemed to be the view of the Committee that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had largely met their obligations under article II.

56. Mr. GAJDA (Hungary) said that the Committee's review should lead to a serious report based on statements and facts. The Committee had a mandate to conduct a review but not to judge. The regime set up by Governments had a mechanism for investigating complaints, a task which fell to IAEA and, subsequently, to the Security Council. The Committee must not seek to do the work of those two bodies, although every country had the right to state its position. The Government of Hungary was complying fully with the provisions of article II and had not been asked or forced to become a nuclear-weapon State.

57. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee had concluded its debate on article II. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed with the content of the first three paragraphs of the preamble. He asked delegations to submit concrete proposals on articles I and II, which would be systematized by the Secretariat for subsequent consideration by the Committee. The draft document would be approved by the Committee prior to submission to the drafting committee.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.